Workshop

Direct Reference and Specifity

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Organizers:

Klaus von Heusinger & Hans Kamp

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Direct Reference and Specificity: A short introduction

Klaus von Heusinger & Hans Kamp

The central aim of this workshop is to get linguists and philosophers of language and mind together to talk about a topic important to both of them - a topic that has meant different things to the two communities, has inspired them to different questions and answers, and where interaction of the kind that is possible within the setting of an ESSLLI workshop could benefit either side.

Specificity, we believe, is such a topic. On the one hand it is a subject which in recent years has had much attention from linguists, primarily in connection with indefinite noun phrases: "Specific" indefinite NPs differ from other "non-specific" indefinites in linguistically relevant ways, the most salient of which is their scopal behavior: Specific indefinites in certain syntactic positions appear to have wider scope than they should if they were quantifier phrases subject to the same island constraints as "genuine" quantifying NPs (such as English NPs beginning with *every* or *most*), as illustrated by (1), which has a reading where the indefinite takes scope over *each student*.

(1) Each student has to come up with three arguments that show that **some/a condition proposed by Chomsky** is wrong.

Sometimes the "specificity" of indefinite NPs is overtly marked - e.g. in Spanish by the particle *a*, in Turkish by the accusative case suffix *-I*, or in English by adjectival modifiers like *certain*, and so on.

(2) Vi *(***a**) **la / una mujer**. (Standard Spanish)
see.past-1.sg the a woman
'I saw the / a (certain) woman.'

(3) (ben) ***bir*** *kitab-**ı*** oku-du-m (Turkish)
I **a** book-**acc** read-past-1sg
'I read **a certain** book.'

Gradually the inventory of "specificity" markings that linguists have registered and studied for their semantic and pragmatic effects has been growing; and the time seems ripe for asking more general questions: Is what we are seeing in these various instances really the same kind of specificity from a semantic or pragmatic point of view? If so, what is the semantic or pragmatic nature of specificity. And if not, what are the different kinds of specificity they involve?

But even though specificity (of whatever sort) is sometimes marked overtly, overt marking is not a general necessity; indeed, it is very far from being the rule. In many languages indefinites can behave like specifics even when superficially indistinguishable from those which behave in a non-specific way. Whatever it is that makes the interpreters of such indefinites interpret them as specific - or that allows speakers to use them so - it is evidently not their perceivable syntactic or morphological form. Thus it is one of the principal questions about indefinites to determine what it is about their general role and meaning which accounts for the fact that so many of them display specificity-like behavior.

From the perspective of the philosophy of language and mind specificity is a concept which is crucially connected with the presence of identifying information. A "specific" use of an indefinites is possible when the speaker has a individual in mind about which he has information that he takes to uniquely identify the individual . (In fact, in many such cases the available information will be well in excess of what unique identification requires). Under such conditions the speaker may choose not to bring his uniquely identifying information fully into linguistic play but instead to talk about the individual through the use of an indefinite NP whose descriptive content covers only a (often small) part of that in formation, which isn't enough for unique identification. What renders the speaker's use of the indefinite "specific" in such cases is at a minimum a causal-intentional link between the object he has in mind and his use of the indefinite to say something which he takes to be true of that object. There also is an interpretational side to the specific use of indefinites in this sense: For the recipient of an indefinite NP the NP can appear as "specific" insofar as she takes the speaker to have made a specific use of it, assuming that the speaker takes himself to have uniquely identifying information about some thing and to use the indefinite to talk about that thing.

(4a) A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam. We all know him.
(4b) A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam. Nobody knows who it is.

Connected with this picture are certain questions that have been seen as important for the philosophy of language and where a closer attention to the ways in which specific indefinites (especially those which are overtly marked as such) work in actual natural languages. One of these questions has to do with the relation between thought and language: Assuming it is correct that the specific use which a speaker makes of an indefinite involves his having uniquely identifying information for what he wants to talk about, and that the recipient' interpreting the indefinite as specific involves her infer that this is what the speaker is doing, this still leaves a certain latitude for what we may want to say is the actual content of the message that is passed from the one to the other. Is the content that is transmitted in such cases a "singular" proposition, which attributes a certain property to the object the speaker "has in mind"; and is what is transmitted the same as what is expressed? Or is the expressed content something weaker – an existential proposition, to the effect that something exists which has the given property?

A different question has to do with where the identifying information is supposed to be. So far we have only spoken of information in the mind of the speaker who uses an indefinite specifically. But it appears that the specificity phenomena which can be observed in natural languages are limited to just this case. In fact, a closely related concern has been prominent within the philosophy of language and logic for over half a century, ever since Quine and others began to consider the problem of "de re" occurrences of indefinites within modal and attitudinal contexts, parallel to the behavior of definite NPs.

(5a) Peter intends to marry **a merchant banker** – even though he doesn't get on at all with her.
(5b) Peter intends to marry **a merchant banker** – though he hasn't met one yet.
(6a) Joan wants to present the prize to **the winner** – but he doesn't want to receive it from her.
(6b) Joan wants to present the prize to **the winner** – so she'll have to wait around till the race finishes.

Occurrences of indefinites within such contexts, it was noted, often allow for interpretations according to which the NP has wide scope with respect to a modal or attitudinal operator. This has been widely taken to entail that the content of the described attitude is a singular proposition; and in the case of attitudinal contexts some have seen this as meaning that the attitude attributes some property to an object for which the bearer of the attitude has identifying information.

These views are consistent with what can be observed for languages with overt specificity marking (such as Spanish *a*, Turkish *-I*, or English *a certain*). Depending on the language particular properties, the presence of such markings either signals speaker-related specificity, as in (8a), or else specificity relating to some other "protagonist" of the given sentence or discourse, as in (8b); and prominent instances of the latter possibility are those tin which the sentence attributes to this participant some propositional attitude.

(7) George: "I met a certain student of mine"
(8) James: "George met a certain student of his."
a: James knows who
b: James does not know, but George knows.

Much the same distinction is found in sentences which attribute propositional attitudes to each of a range of different protagonists, as in (9).

(9) Every politician had decided that a certain institute had to be closed.

(10.a) With such unanimity of opinion it was clear that the institute could not be saved.

(10.b) But since they couldn't agree which institute should be closed down, everything remained the way it had been.

(9) can be interpreted as involving some kind of specificity irrespective of whether it is followed by (10.a) or by (10.b). It is clear, however, that in the case of (10.b) the specific indefinite does not have maximal scope. This shows that there is at least one kind of specificity which does not entail maximal scope as a matter of course. Scopal behaviour of indefinite NPs and questions of specificity must thus be distinguished. One of the linguistic challenges is to understand better how the two are related. An important issue connected with this is whether there are parallels here with the different uses of definite descriptions, and how these parallels might be stated.

We hope that through the joint efforts of linguists and philosophers during the workshop we will arrive at a clearer understanding of at least some these issues.

Specificity and referentiality

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Abstract for the workshop "Direct Reference and Specificity"

at ESSLLI XV in Vienna, August, 18-22, 2003

Indefinite descriptions have been claimed to show an ambiguity, often labeled a specific/nonspecific ambiguity, when they occur in simple sentences which contain no (other) sentence operators with which to vary their scope. This claim is reminiscent of the claim of Donnellan (1966) that definite descriptions may be used referentially as well as attributively. Neale (1990) argued at length against viewing Donnellan's distinction as semantic, and Ludlow & Neale (1991) have argued along similar lines that the specific/nonspecific distinction in indefinite descriptions is not semantic but rather pragmatic. This paper responds to the arguments presented by Ludlow & Neale and presents arguments and evidence that both distinctions **are** semantic.

One important issue is the nature of the specific reading of indefinites. As it is frequently characterized, it is a referential reading – there is reference to some individual, and this individual plays a role in the truth conditions of the utterance. On this view the utterance expresses a singular, or "object dependent" proposition, even one that contains the actual object referred to as a constituent (if we follow Russell on the nature of such propositions). It is a reading so characterized which is the main focus of the Ludlow & Neale critique.

Ludlow & Neale cite three arguments which Russell (1919) gave in support of his quantificational analysis of indefinite descriptions, and opposed to any referential interpretation. Russell's example is (1)

(1) I met a man.

Suppose that the speaker of (1) met Jones, and that (1) is the report of that incident. Nevertheless it would not be contradictory to assert (2):

(2) I met a man but I did not meet Jones.

(2) would be false, under the circumstances, but not contradictory. The second argument is that an addressee can perfectly well understand an utterance of (1) without any knowledge of Jones. And the third argument depends on the fact that a sentence like (3)

(3) I saw a perpetual motion machine.

may be used to express a proposition (albeit a false one even though there is no possible referent for the indefinite description.

All of these arguments suffer from a disability (acknowledged by Ludlow & Neale for the first). No one denies that indefinite descriptions have a purely quantificational reading which would allow a noncontradictory understanding of (2), which someone who doesn't know Jones could well understand, and which would allow (3) to express a proposition. Thus these arguments do not show that sentences like (1) are not ambiguous. In addition the third argument depends on a particular conception of the specific reading, which is problematic on independent grounds. An alternative, on which specific readings of indefinite descriptions are interpreted as constant individual concepts does not have these problems.

Kripke (1978) had argued against viewing Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction as semantic and Ludlow & Neale cite these arguments approvingly and reprise

analogs for indefinites. Kripke had three main arguments against viewing Donnellan's distinction as semantic. One is methodological: it is not good to proliferate ambiguities without warrant. This argument is set aside, pending production of warrant. The second involves a novel argument form of the following structure: if phenomenon A would occur in a language stipulated to have property X, then its occurrence in English cannot argue that English does not have property X. The property in question is having definite descriptions interpreted as Russell claimed, and the phenomenon is an understanding like Donnellan's referential reading. This argument, while clever, is not really conclusive. We might use the same form to argue, for example, that *want* does not mean 'desire', because if it only meant 'lack', people would use it to express desire as well. (See also the discussion in Reimer 1998a.) The third argument involved a modification of an example given by Linsky:

(4) A. "Her husband is kind to her."
B. "No, he isn't. The man you're referring to isn't her husband."

The problem is that B's first pronoun should lack an antecedent, since on Donnellan's analysis A has used the phrase *her husband* to refer to the woman's lover. This argument depends on an unfortunate aspect of Donnellan's exposition, one which has been taken as definitive of the referential use of definite descriptions but which in fact need not be so. That is Donnellan's claim that, used referentially, a definite description may refer to an entity that does not meet its descriptive content. But there is independent evidence against this claim of Donnellan's. In fact, that quality (reference to an entity not semantically related to the noun phrase used) **is** characteristic of speaker's reference as opposed to semantic reference, and holds for both referentially and attributively used definite descriptions as well as proper names.

There are a few positive arguments in favor of a semantic analysis for both the referential-attributive distinction and the specific-nonspecific distinction. Reimer (1998b) argues that if a sentence is standardly used to convey a certain type of proposition, where that proposition is suitably constrained by the linguistic meanings of the parts of the sentence, then, ceteris paribus, it expresses that proposition. Wilson (1991) has pointed out that definite descriptions have pronominal uses, including bound variable uses, as in (5)

(5) a. Serena Williams fought hard but <u>the defending French open champion</u> could not extinguish Henin-Hardenne.
b. Every Bulgarian astronomer was greeted by someone who knew <u>the scientist</u> as a youth.

Finally, for indefinite descriptions, it can be pointed out that (6a) has a reading which (6b) does not have:

(6) a. I had lunch with a logician.
b. Have lunch with a logician!

In a null context (6b) lacks a specific reading because it would be infelicitous to suggest that someone have lunch with a specific logician without giving them enough information to figure out which one. The contrast with (6a) provides intuitive support for the distinction.

I also try to clarify the nature of the problematic specific/referential readings. I relate them to the traditional *de re-de dicto* ambiguities, responding to Kripke's arguments that there is no such relation. I argue (following Kaplan 1978) that specific indefinites and referential definites are not nondescriptional (and hence not directly referential in that sense). However they do share something like the rigid designation property of proper names, where this is best interpreted as involving constant individual concepts, rather than directly designated entities.

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Specificity, Automatic Designation, and 'I'

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1 Specificity

In its most common linguistic use, *specificity* refers to a kind of definiteness. This is expressed by the grammatical marking on an NP, showing that the speaker knows the identity of the referent. Thus, a police chief has (presumably) a particular Colombian in mind when he utters "My agents cannot wait to interrogate the Colombian."

While the above explanation seems straightforward, specificity has come to be known as a subtle notion. There have been a variety of suggestions as to its meaning – thanks to the considerable output produced in the seventies and early eighties in the semantics of specificity – but a uniform definition of the term has not been agreed upon.[1]

Similarly, the relation between specificity and definiteness is one that is discernible though what exactly this relation consists of has been a topic of controversy. A common practice is to describe this elusive relation on a scale based on identifiability by speaker and hearer, as illustrated in Table 1. Attributed to Talmy Givón, the table originally omitted a definite non-specific interpretation (which we have added as the second column).[2]

This paper studies the context-dependence of the first-person indexical 'I,' while attempting to make the identifiability criteria for specificity and

[1] Thus, Jørgensen (2000: 146) notes that the term has been used to draw at least four different distinctions: (i) whether the speaker believes the referent to be unique; (ii) whether the speaker knows the identity of the referent; (iii) whether the speaker wants to express a generalization, and (iv) whether the speaker believes the identity of the referent to be important. It is known that several allegedly sound descriptions of specificity mentioned in the literature fail to be adequate on their own in covering all conditions of the notion. A prolific author contributing to recent literature on specificity, von Heusinger (2002: 2) explicates assorted characterizations of this notion. (See *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 19, no. 3, for a special issue on specificity, guest-edited by him and

identified by	def spec	def non-spec	indef spec	indef non-spec
speaker	+	−	+	−
hearer	+	+	−	−

Table 1: The 'identifiability' criteria for definiteness and specificity (*Legend:* def $\rightsquigarrow$ definite, spec $\rightsquigarrow$ specific)

definiteness clearer for this important indexical. Having been influenced by John Perry's work on indexicals, we'll show that this (seemingly) clearest case of an indexical poses a difficulty.

Let's start off the discussion with an account of contextualism vs. invariantism. According to Unger (1984), when a man says (pointing in the direction of a baseball field) "That field is flat," he might mean something like the following:

> According to contextually relevant standards, that field is sufficiently close to being such that nothing could ever be flatter than it is.

This is the contextualist stance. In other words, for a *contextualist*, there is an implicit reference to a contextual standard; 'what is said' is not itself a simple thing.

On the other hand, for an *invariantist*, no additional content about contextually relevant standards is needed. Thus, the above statement would mean that the field is perfectly (absolutely) flat. In this view, 'what is said' is more simply related to the man's sounds.

2 Automatic designation

Now, with respect to contexts for indexicals, Perry emphasizes two distinctions. These together give rise to the four categories shown in Table 2.

Kerstin Schwabe.)

[2]Here's a brief explanation of Table 1. Definite NPs are employed if both the speaker and hearer can identify the referent. Specific indefinite NPs indicate that the speaker, but not the hearer can identify the referent. Non-specific definite NPs denote that the hearer, but not the speaker can identify the referent (e.g., talking in your sleep). Finally, non-specific indefinites show that neither of them can identify the referent. On a related note, while von Heusinger (2002) argues forcefully against this traditional account, our work in this paper is not influenced by his critique.

1. (Narrow vs. Wide) Does designation depend on narrow or wide context?

2. (Automatic vs. Intentional) Is designation automatic (given meaning and public contextual facts) or does it depend in part on the intentions of the speaker?

Perry envisions *narrow context* as consisting of constitutive facts about the utterance, e.g., the agent, time, and location. He then claims: "The clearest case of an indexical that relies only on the narrow context is 'I,' whose designation depends on the agent and *nothing else*." (our italics)

Perry characterizes *wide context* as consisting of the narrow facts plus anything else that might be relevant, according to the workings of a particular indexical. For example, when one says "It is yea big," one usually has his hands outstretched to a certain distance and this distance is a contextual factor for the indexical 'yea.'

By *automatic*, Perry means a designation which uses no intentions. An utterance of 'yesterday' is a good example. He claims that such an utterance would designate the day before the utterance occurs, no matter what the speaker intends.

Table 2: Types of indexicals†		
	Narrow	*Wide*
Automatic	I, now*, here*	tomorrow, yea
Intentional	now, here	that, this man, there

† [adapted from (Perry, 1997)]

The designation of an utterance of 'that field,' on the other hand, is not automatic. The man's intention is relevant. There may be two fields in the vicinity when he says, "That field is flat." Which of them he refers to depends on his intention.

Here's a crucial passage from (Perry, 1997):

> The indexicals 'I', 'now', and 'here' are often given an honored place as "pure" or "essential" indexicals. [...] In Table [2], this *honored place* is represented by the cell labeled "narrow" and "automatic." However, it is not clear that 'now' and 'here' deserve this status, *hence the asterisks*. With 'here' there is the question of how large an area is to count, and with 'now' the

> question of how large a stretch of time. [...] It seems then that these indexicals really have an intentional element. (our italics)

Now the question is: Does 'I' really deserve its privileged status? We think that the following scenarios imply a negative reply.

SCENARIO 1. Predelli (1998: 409, fn. 18) mentions an example due to Arnold Zwicky that the latter has dubbed *the phony inclusive use of we*. When a waitress says "How are we today?" to a customer, what we have here is a display of intention to contain only the addressee (customer), and not the waitress herself.

Inspired by this example, consider the sentence "How am I doing today?" uttered by Yeltsin (in bed due to a terrible heart ailment) to a *double* of his who's just going out to meet with the North Korean delegation. The intention of Yeltsin is to question the ability and preparedness of the double to play Yeltsin's part convincingly in the meeting. Thus, his intention is more like "Are you ready to fool them?" (If there are several doubles, he might instead utter, "How are we doing today?" and the situation is similar to Zwicky's example.)

SCENARIO 2. Kaplan says in "Demonstratives" (1989: 491) that he considers 'I' as a *pure* indexical, viz. something for which "*no associated demonstration is required, and any demonstration supplied is either for emphasis or is irrelevant*" (his italics). He then adds (ibid., fn. 11): "I have in mind such cases as point at oneself while saying 'I' (emphasis) or pointing at someone else while saying 'I' (irrelevance or madness or what?)."

Now imagine a beat-up Yeltsin visiting the Madame Tussaud's London and admiring his shining waxwork with the words "I'm the most vigorous man here." (Pointing is not even necessary.)

To continue with our scenario, suppose there has been an unsuccessful attack on Yeltsin's life. The KGB recorded the whole incident and he's watching it. There's a certain moment he utters: "I'm about to be attacked!"

Alternatively, there has been a successful attack on Yeltsin's life. But he was not in the car; his double was. Watching his unfortunate double stop breathing, he utters: "Now, I'm dead."

3 An explanation

What do the counter-examples of the preceding section show? We'll now try to hypothesize an explanation.

First remember a principle underlying almost all of our practical reasoning (Kim, 1996):

> [*Defeasibility of mental-behavioral entailments*] If there is a plausible entailment of behavior B by mental states $M_1, \ldots, M_n$, there is always a further mental state M_{n+1} such that $M_1, \ldots, M_n, M_{n+1}$ together plausibly entail $\neg B$ [failure to produce behavior B].

Let's introduce *contextual feature* as a term of profession. Now, the following parallel principle can be stated:

> [*Defeasibility of contextual interpretations*] If there is a plausible interpretation K of a certain expression in the presence of contextual features $C_1, \ldots, C_n$, there is (always?) a further contextual feature C_{n+1} such that $C_1, \ldots, C_n, C_{n+1}$ together plausibly entail a different interpretation $\neg K$.

In a nutshell, this is exactly what's happening with 'I' in the examples above: a further contextual feature is being brought into play to render the interpretation of 'I' nontrivial.

Like Unger, we believe that neither contextualism nor invariantism is a definite semantic position one would like to adopt. Once again, when a man says "That field$_1$ is flat$_2$," it may be wiser to take an invariantist stance regarding the first part and a contextualist stance regarding the second. This is also what we should do for 'I' too, depending on its contexts of occurrence.[3]

[3]Similar views were presented by several philosophers. Thus Bianchi(2001: 84): "The reference of 'I' is not a direct function of the context of utterance (the semantic context); its context of interpretation is fixed by recognizing the utterance producer's intentions, hence by relying on pragmatic considerations. The rule associated with 'I' seems now to be

> an occurrence of 'I' refers to the individual the producer of the utterance indicates as responsible for the utterance in the given context.

We thus introduce an intentional factor in the very rule associated with 'I.' "

And Corazza et al. (2002): "The context or setting of a linguistic interchange plays a role in determining how the agent is determined. The agent of 'I,' like the relevant

4 References

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contextual parameters such as the time and place, is best understood to be the *conventionally determined* agent, and the agent determined by convention may well be distinct from either the utterer or the producer of the token of 'I.' "

Folk Ideas About Reference and Specific Indefinites

Informal discourse about specific indefinites often employs ideas such as 'the individual the speaker had in mind'. Although this kind of discourse most often seems to proceed coherently, many semanticists are sceptical about theoretical or formal accounts employing these notions. In this paper, we argue that folk ideas about reference are central to semantics, figuring in the truth conditions of some specifically used indefinites. We adapt some proposals found in Perry (2001) to clarify what these ideas might be. We further argue that while discourse containing specific indefinites may make reference to speaker's referents, the indefinite forms themselves are never directly referential, rather they are attributive. Finally, we aim to provide a taxonomy of specific indefinites by assuming only an analysis of indefinites as existential quantified noun phrases (QNPs), and by assuming other independently motivated mechanisms such as contextual restriction of quantifier domains.

Stalnaker's (1998) proposal for specific indefinites found in discourses like (1) is similar to Kripke's proposal about referentially used definite descriptions. For Stalnaker, the first sentence just has a meaning which determines an existential proposition, but at the utterance level, the first sentence introduces a 'speaker's referent' to which reference is subsequently made with the pronoun.

(1) A man walked in the park. He whistled.

There is a difference however in that for the referentially used definite description, the pragmatically introduced proposition is singular, containing the actual speaker's referent. Stalnaker's proposal about the indefinite employs diagonalisation which yields the attributive proposition that the individual the speaker has in mind walked in the park. That is, the pragmatically introduced proposition is not singular since in each possibility in Stalnaker's 2-D context the speaker could have a different individual in mind. This analysis is bourne out by the fact that (1) can be embedded in an attitude report, (2), with the same 'Geachean' reading but without any accompanying *de re* reading:

(2) John thinks that a man walked in the park and that he whistled.

So-called exceptional scope indefinites of the kind in (3) have independently received a lot of attention because they seem to take scope where no NP-movement is possible:

(3) a. If an uncle of John's dies, John will be rich.
b. Every linguist has studied every analysis that has been proposed for some problem.

Kratzer (1998) argues for a formal ambiguity account of indefinites whereby they are sometimes existential QNPs and sometimes complexes combining variables over skolemised partial choice functions and their syntactic arguments. Kratzer also claims that indefinites containing 'a certain' are unambiguously referential. So (4)a is analysed along the lines of (4)b where both function variable and individual variable are assigned a value by context :

(4) a. A certain man walked in the park.
b. WiP(f(x,man))

There is some motivation for this in that, unlike the first sentence in (1), the truth of (4)a depends on whether the speaker's referent was a man who walked in the park. Also, in as far as specific indefinites without 'a certain' can have the same analysis, we obtain the wide scope and intermediate scope effects in (3) without NP movement.

Kratzer's proposal for (4) shares some problems with Hintikka's (1986) alternative according to which 'a certain'-noun phrases are existential but they always take scope ('have priority') over epistemic operators. There seem to be cases where this will not work. Consider that (5) seems perfectly coherent and sensible with an intermediate scope reading:

(5) I doubt that John thinks his boss prefers a certain type of hors d'oeuvre. Otherwise he wouldn't have prepared twenty different varieties.

(5) represents two problems in one for Kratzer. The first, noted in Chierchia (2001), is that in negative contexts, specific indefinites have a non-specific, intermediate scope reading. This is

illustrated in (6)a,b both of which can be understood according to the gloss in (6)c.:

(6) a. It's not the case that if an uncle of John dies, John will be rich
b. It's not the case that if a certain uncle of John dies, John will be rich
c. $\neg\exists x$ [uncle_of_john(x) $\wedge$ (die(x) $\rightarrow$ rich(j))]

We shall suggest a way out of Chierchia's problem below. The second, independent problem, is that these specific indefinites need to be, in some sense, attributive. This can be illustrated with (7) which has an intermediate scope reading:

(7) It might be that John thinks his boss prefers a certain type of hors d'oeuvre. So he might prepare just one type.

To overcome this problem, Kratzer could suppose that 'a certain' indefinites are composed not of a variable over skolemised choice functions but something like a variable over functions from indices to such functions. The proposal then could be that when the index is dependent on the modal operator in (7), the intermediate scope reading is obtained; when dependent on 'thinks', a narrow scope construal would be obtained according to which it may be that John thinks only that there is some particular type of hors d'oeuvre that his boss favours. On this construal, the follow up sentence above is pragmatically odd. Better would be, "So he might try to find out what that type is.".

In fact, as discussed below, there are up to 12 construals of (7), corresponding to the product of the four possible scopes for the indefinite and the three possible epistemic states which 'certain' can be linked to. This multiplicity of readings points to further, conceptual problems with Kratzer's account. If we consider again our intuitions about the truth conditions of (4)a, we find that truth turns on how things are with the speaker's referent. This does not follow at all from (4)b since context could assign any value to *f* and *x*. But, we would argue, context never assigns any other kind of value to the function. So Kratzer's proposal does not fully capture the meaning of 'a certain' indefinites.

Although we agree that the exceptional scope indefinites should be treated along the lines of 'a certain' indefinites, we would propose that 'a certain' indefinites are just existential QNPs and that 'certain' is just a predicate restricting the quantification:

(8) The semantic rule for $certain_u$ makes reference to the utterance, u, of the noun phrase in which it is contained and says that $certain_u$ expresses the property represented by the **identifying idea**, i_u, involved in the representation of the speaker's ground for this utterance.

The idea of *identifying ideas* comes from Perry (2001) which posits mental particulars (**notions**) representing individuals. **Ideas** are mental particulars which represent properties these individuals have. **Identifying ideas** are ideas which represent identifying properties (i.e. properties which necessarily are uniquely instantiated if at all). Ideas are associated with notions in files. Files result from what Perry calls the 'detach and recognise game' whereby buffers containing notions of, and associated ideas about, individuals are retained beyond perceptions of that individual.

Notions are born of perceptions - either of individuals or of acts of referring. Intersubjective notion networks build up through communication. Although Plato's notion of Socrates is borne of his perceptions of Socrates, Perry's notion of Socrates is born of perceptions of texts Plato wrote containing references to Socrates. There are a variety of ways in which notion networks can end not with an individual but what Perry calls a 'block'. This can be through misperceptions (of individuals or utterances) and a variety of other means (including the free creation of notions).

One condition on a functioning file is that it contain at least one identifying idea. Sometimes the only identifying ideas for a file are obtained through being told something like, "I met an interesting woman last night". In that case one identifying idea will be of whoever stands at the end of the notion network in which the speaker's notion of the individual introduced is embedded. This latter point highlights a feature of Perry's proposal: that something like notions, (identifying) ideas and notion networks figure in our folk semantics. One can assume (with Perry and this author) that these folk ideas are underpinned by the fact that there really are such mental particulars which carry information (or, at least, content) about objects and properties. However, independently of that issue, we can find motivation for the proposal that notions, ideas etc do play a role in semantics (other than

in the semantics for 'a certain') by considering some problems with current accounts of Hob-Nob examples.

It is well known that Hob-Nob examples (as in (9)) carry implications about how Hob and Nob think about the witch in question without the speaker or audience believing in witches, without Hob and Nob having ever met and without them thinking of the witch in the ways described in the other attribution (as the killer of Mary's pig or John's cow respectively).

(9) Hob thinks a witch killed John's cow and Nob thinks she killed Mary's pig.

That is, even with sceptical conversants, an utterance of (9) implies that there is an identifying property such that in Hob's epistemic alternatives the non-existent witch has it and in Nob's epistemic alternatives his non-existent witch has it. Neale (1990), assuming a kind of pragmatic E-type account, suggests that the identifying property in question could be something like *being the local witch*. Van Rooy's (1997) analysis implies just that there is such a property (known to the speaker). But neither of these suggestions are quite right. To see this, consider the scenario where Hob comes upon John's cow mysteriously dead and he has certain beliefs about mysterious bovine deaths which lead him to conclude that only a witch could have caused the death. Hob also believes that at any one time, there can be at most one witch operating in his area, A. Thus he forms the belief that there is a unique witch in area A and this witch killed John's cow. At the same time, Nob goes through the same kind of process upon his discovery of Mary's pig dead. That is, Nob comes to believe that there is a unique witch in area A which caused the death of this pig. Hob knows nothing of Nob and Mary's pig while Nob knows nothing of Hob or John's cow. Moreover, there has been no public discussion of any sort of mysterious deaths or of witches. We could describe this scenario using (10):

(10) Hob believes that there is a unique witch in area A who is such that she killed John's cow. Nob believes that there is a unique witch in area A who is such that she killed Mary's pig.

However, we could not describe this scenario using the Hob-Nob sentence, (9). What is missing from our scenario, it seems, is some kind of link between Hob's imaginary witch and Nob's imaginary witch which is more than a shared identifying property. For instance, if we add to the above scenario that both Hob and Nob see and believe a tv news report about an active witch then we could acceptably report on the scenario using the Hob-Nob sentence. It seems that what is being imputed by Hob-Nob sentences with sceptical conversants is that there is a notion network through which both Hob and Nob could identify their respective imaginary witches. I.e., there is a notion network, NN, which is such that, (under some mode of presentation) Hob believes that the individual standing at the end of NN is the witch that killed John's cow and (under some mode of presentation) Nob believes the individual standing at the end of NN is the witch that killed Mary's pig.

We shall not be pursuing a full analysis of intentional identity statements in this paper. The above example, if it's analysis is on the right track, is just meant to independently motivate the idea that notions, ideas and so on do play a role in our ordinary intuitions about meaning.

The rule suggested in (8) represents the minimal meaning of 'certain'. Often, a speaker will use these indefinites and mean to convey more than this minimal meaning. This is illustrated in the jokey (11) where it is presupposed Sue and Bill know who John left with:

(11) {*John and Mary are having an affair which they believe is secret. But, two of their office-mates, Bill and Sue, have together found out about this 'secret' affair.*}
Bill (to Sue): I hear that John left the staff party with a certain female colleague last night.

Sometimes, a speaker will imply that their grounds are only deferential. In (12) below, the mother is implying that she has in mind the girl Bill has in mind:

(12) {John and Mary are discussing their teenage son, Bill, as he leaves for school}
Mary: Did you notice how carefully Bill got ready for school. I expect he wants to impress a

certain girl in his class.

The variety of readings of (7) above come about in a similar manner: The speaker's identifying idea could be of whatever John's, or John's boss's, is of. So, when the scope of the indefinite is intermediate between 'might' and 'thinks', the follow-up sentence in (7) suggests a construal where it is the type John has in mind. But if it were construed so that it is the type the boss has in mind, then we could appropriately follow up with, "So, he might impress his boss after all". There is also a (marginal) construal with the same scope but with simply the speaker's referent. This could be followed up with, "But I'll have to look up the recipe books to see if it exists".

The example in (3)a would be treated by supposing that the quantificational indefinite noun phrase is implicitly restricted with $certain_u$, as suggested by (13):

(13) $\exists x[\text{certain}_u(x) \wedge \text{uncle\_of\_john}(x) \wedge \text{die}(x)] \rightarrow \text{rich}(j)$

Regarding Chierchia's problem with negative contexts, we can give a general solution to this which exploits the idea that speakers can implicate (or rather, presuppose) more about their grounds than suggested by the minimal meaning of the sentence. In general, Chierchia's problem arises where a specific indefinite, *some F*, is contained within the scope of some operator, *[O...some F...]*, and where this whole complex is in some negative or DE environment, *[neg..[O..some F..]]*. In (6)a,b above, the indefinite is embedded in a conditional inside negation. In that case, we can assume that the speaker is (globally) presupposing something extra about the kind of uncle she has in mind. In order to get the 'non-specific' reading glossed in (6)c, the presupposition would be along the lines of the necessary condition in (14):

(14) $\forall x \, \Box\text{certain}_u(x) \rightarrow (\exists y[\text{uncle\_of\_john}(y) \wedge (\text{die}(y) \rightarrow \text{rich}(j))] \rightarrow (\text{die}(x) \rightarrow \text{rich}(j)))$

In general, if $\phi(x)$ is the result of extracting *some F* from *[O...some F...]*, then the presupposition for the 'non-specific' intermediate construal in negative contexts is suggested by (15):

(15) $\forall x \, \Box\text{certain}_u(x) \rightarrow (\exists y[Fy \wedge \phi(y)] \rightarrow \phi(x))$

We will also show how to extend the analysis to cater for the 'bound into' readings of these specific indefinites (as in (3)b). This will simply exploit mechanisms necessary to account for the reading of (16) below such that the object noun phrase is understood as 'every bottle he was given':

(16) Every bad boy broke every bottle

Finally, we will suggest why, in exceptional scope cases, identifying properties actually restrict quantification (and therefore figure in truth conditions) but in other cases, (1), they merely figure in indirectly introduced information. This has to do with the fact that, in the latter cases, the same conversational purpose (introducing the speaker's referent for subsequent anaphoric reference) would be served without enriching the content of what is said. By the maxim which says to be no more informative in what you say than is required for the conversational purpose, there are no grounds for assuming the speaker is saying anything stronger than the minimal proposition.

To sum up, we have seen that the interpretation of specific indefinites quite plausibly involves identifying properties instantiated by a speaker's referent (or possible referent). The link can either be through an *identifying idea* (in the case of 'a certain' or exceptional scope indefinites) or *notion networks* (in Hob-Nob cases and probably also (1)). Some specific indefinites introduce this property as part of the truth conditions ('a certain' and exceptional scope indefinites and Hob-Nob cases) while others indirectly, (1). The speaker's referent never figures directly in any of the communicated propositions (unlike with definites). Thus these specific indefinites are 'attributive' - in any sense of that term.

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Referential stability and differential object marking in Romanian

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Abstract for the workshop "Direct Reference and Specificity"
at ESSLLI XV in Vienna, August, 18-22, 2003

This paper has two goals: (i) to define a new semantic dimension that characterizes noun phrases, which we call referential stability; (ii) to show that referential stability is relevant to Differential Object Marking (DOM) in Romanian.

We start the paper with presenting the main facts of DOM in Romanian, a phenomenon that consists of marking with a special preposition, *pe* a subclass of direct objects. We show that, abstracting away from animacy, the pronominal/non-pronominal distinction and position relative to the V, this phenomenon is sensitive to the two scales in (1) (see Aissen (to appear) for the relevance of (1a) to DOM cross-linguistically):

(1) a. Proper Name > Definite Description > Indefinite Description
b. widest scope indefinite > narrow scope indefinite

We will show that the higher a noun phrase is on these hierarchies the more prone it is to be marked by *pe* when a DO. The question that arises is what semantic parameter is responsible for these facts? This question divides into the following subquestions: (i) what parameter explains the hierarchy in (1a)? (ii) what is responsible for the fact that a widest scope indefinite patterns more like a definite than a narrow scope indefinite.

In the next part of the paper we define the notion of referential stability and show that it is relevant to the answers to these questions. Referential stability concerns the issue of stability of value given to a variable across verifying assignment functions. The narrower the allowed variation, the more referentially stable the expression is. We distinguish between various dimensions of variation and thus various types of referential stability. Proper names are most referentially stable in the sense that once the contextual world parameter is fixed, so is their value, independently of where they occur. Definite descriptions are referentially stable in the sense that once the input assignment function is given, their value relative to verifying updated assignments is fixed as well. (This is a dynamic version of the uniqueness condition on definites proposed in Kadmon 1992). Indefinite noun phrases are referentially unstable in that in principle they allow variation across updates with respect to the value given to the variable they introduce. Note now that narrow scope resulting in co-variation affects referential stability since it results in a variable having to be given multiple values relative to a single verifying assignment. After discussing different types of referential stability we will discuss the various noun phrase classes this parameter allows us to define. The upshot of the discussion is that the hierarchies in (1) are hierarchies of referential stability. Turning back to DOM in Romanian we will defend the claim that DOM in this language is sensitive to referential stability in the sense that the more referentially stable a noun phrase is the better DOM trigger it will be. We will conclude our discussion of DOM in Romanian by showing that the complex facts involved follow the general pattern proposed in Aissen (to appear) cross-linguistically though more parameters need to be added. Recourse to referential stability is needed to account for an important subclass of of these. We close the paper by discussing the way in which referential stability underlies various notions of specificity that have been used in the literature.

Why are there names?

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In this talk I will take familiar observations about the "directness" of the reference of names – which have become something of an orthodoxy in philosophy today – for granted. In other words, for the purposes of this talk, I will simply assume that a name with a descriptive content simply would not be a name. Even though it may look like a name phonetically, it will hide a quantificational structure underneath, in the mental representations underlying it on the relevant occasion of use. What then is the answer to my title question? One answer appeals to pragmatic utility in communication. However, even if the observations leading to this intuitive claim are right, it is clear that names may be useful, without their utility being the cause of their existence. In fact, I argue, that would be rather expected. The existence of names over and above descriptions is a universal design feature of human languages, apparently, and it is not likely independent of their structural make-up. The latter however is not standardly assumed to have a rationale in functional utility. While communicative efficiency may well be the reason for why human languages spread so rapidly once they existed, it is not likely the rationale of their existence (Carstairs-McCarthy 1999, Uriagereka 1998). More generally, in these post-Lamarckian times we have come to expect that organisms do not adapt to their environment and its selective pressures by growing appropriate traits. Adaptation is the *indirect* effect of crucially *undirected* mutations, on the one hand, and natural selection, on the other.

I argue that names have a solely *internalist* rationale in the structures that human syntax, whatever the latter's origins, provide. This is to say that purely structural features of the mental representations underlying ordinary language use are responsible for there being names over and above descriptions. Concretely, we have to look at the structure of the determiner phrase, and we see that human syntax of itself provides the options necessary for certain modes of reference to exist.

The argument centrally uses Longobardi's (1994) study of the syntax of proper names, which departs from the basic generalization that nominals in argument position need to be introduced by a determiner (D). This generalizations is as such false for most languages, in particular it is false for bare nominals such as bare plurals, mass nouns, and proper names (when occurring determinerless). Hence there is a question of why these three constructions should be allowed to occur determinerless. This is particularly surprising in the light of the fact that bare plurals and mass nouns plausibly contain a hidden D that arguably receives a *default existential* interpretation. Such a hidden D, with that interpretation, is not what we need in the case of proper names, on the other hand, which differ in other respects, too, for example scope respects. Some writers, such as Burge in early work and more recently Elugardo (2002), have argued that the determinerlessness of names is perhaps a mere surface phenomenon, in the sense that all bare names contain a *hidden* determiner. But I argue that this cannot be right, as names together with determiners typically give rise to contrastive readings, as in *This Tyson strikes me as a sad memory of his former self*, in which case the directness effect is gone (the latter is crucially not

created, it seems, by the presence of a demonstrative as Burge thought). The directness effect, to the extent that we have evidence for it, thus speaks against the presence of hidden determiners, and there are other considerations too.

An interesting complication for this conclusion are "affective" demonstratives, as in *That Thatcher was a pain for England*, which need not be read contrastively, or descriptively. While that complication has to be taken care of separately, I follow Longobardi in explaining the directness effect on the basis of his theory of a forced movement of names in N to D. If the name vacates N in logical form, rather than providing a domain for a variable bound by a quantifier in D to range over, reference is not determined by means of an operator-variable structure, but directly, in D itself. This is to assume, with Chomsky (1995) that D is the locus of reference, a suggestion that in the minimalist framework comes to the suggestion that there is a REF-feature in D that needs to be eventually "checked" by means of a transformation in the course of the derivation. If Longobardi is right, it can be checked in the two ways just mentioned (by an operator, or by the N itself through a move), and the two ways correspond to two different semantic modes of reference. In particular, if there is no place for a quantifier to bind a variable, the name itself being in D, direct reference falls out as a consequence from a syntactic operations. So does rigidity. For if the syntactic form has no room for descriptive concepts in terms of which the human mind analyzes its object of reference on an occasion according to various parts or properties that it has, there is nothing in the mental representations underlying the name that could vary as we move from world to world.

This gives a concrete empirical content to the claim that names have an internalist rationale in N-to-D movement. While Longobardi points out that his theory "supports the causal theory of reference" deriving from the work of Kripke, I cannot read but his theory as suggesting that causation actually plays *no role* in explaining the specific referential modality of names.

I discuss Longobardi's theory in view of these implications, extend it tentatively to pronouns, and defend it against recent objections by Segal (2002), who, I argue, refutes Longobardi (and Burge) for the wrong reasons. Methodologically, my conclusion suggests that reference is no lexical matter at all (words in the technical sense of lexical items to which syntactic operations have not yet applied, do not as such refer). Indeed, there are *many* referential modalities that a name like *Goethe* can on an occasion have, and each of these depend on specific syntactic configurations. In particular, *Goethe* can refer to a mass, as in *Es gibt noch viel Goethe zu entdecken*, or to a Goethe-stage, as in *The early Goethe is more popular than the rest*. The option of direct reference, as in *Goethe is the greatest German writer ever*, is just one among many.

This will raise the objection in all these occurrences, the name *Goethe* as such, no matter its syntactic environment, still always refers to the same thing. The Goethe-stage, say, is still a stage of Goethe. But while all agree that *Goethe* refers to Goethe, the question now is what this thing *is* (supposing it is an external physical object, as standardly assumed). An answer might be: the referent is an assembly of matter persisting in its rough mode of organization during such-and-such a space-time continuum, disregarding substantive changes. But it might also be that the referent is a memory that living people today have. Still other native speakers intuit that the needed referent is a history of exgesis, together with historical texts. It is interesting that ordinary speakers diverge radically on the putative worldly referents of the words they unproblematically use, a fact that suggests that the meaning of names has actually little to do with the *actual physical* nature of their objects of reference (a point that Chomsky 2000 emphasizes). Thus if it

turned out in an experiment that *Bill Gates* was nothing but a visual illusion, we would read in the papers that *Bill Gates proved a visual illusion*, in which, I take it, the name *Bill Gates* is used exactly as it was before, and with the same meaning (*he* has acquired this novel and striking property). It thus seems that over and above the technical arguments above, the prospects for a causal-externalist theory of names look rather grim – crucially with no such implication as that there is no such thing as the directness effect. For the latter has the internalist rationale described above.

As long as we assume that a measure for semantic complexity is *syntactic* complexity, it is plausible to suggest that in human languages reference *starts* where the mental representations underlying the use of the name is *least* complex: the name is inserted in N, stays there, and has a hidden determiner. The second stage is where the determiner becomes overt, and the user has now the resources to mentally configure an object of reference that is not an indefinite amount of Goethe-mass, but a specific Goethe, as in *the early Goethe*. We encounter the same transition when moving from talking about *chicken* to *a chicken* or *chickens*, the latter two expressions also being linguistically more complex from the former. The stage, finally, where we have direct reference is in this hierarchy the last and most complex, as it has to be configured through a syntactic transformation. If we read the "hierarchy of reference" in this way off the syntactic form and how it gradually complexifies, this shows that we must rethink our intuition that somehow *a chicken* – an individual object – is semantically more basic than the stuff it is made of, namely chicken. Similarly, we must rethink our intuition that the direct referent of Goethe, whatever it is, is more basic than the Goethe-mass. *Linguistically*, individual-specific reference is *more* complex than a generic or mass-reference.

We should not be surprised about such a conclusion, though, as the intuition about the priority of "substances" or individual objects may simply derive from an instinctive empiricism that we should have become suspicious about long since. Only for the empiricist should external individual objects that we encounter with our sensorium and that we stand in causal relations with, be the source of the meaning of names. For the rationalist, it is simply not surprising that what kind of thing something like *Goethe* refers to on an occasion, after being selected from the mental lexicon, cannot be understood but from the workings of the mind itself.

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Specificity: two opposites, three variants

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What is commonly understood by specificity is not one concept, but two different, although interrelated, semantic features. Leaving aside specificity in the sense of non-genericity, which would be a third meaning, specificity as a semantic feature of indefinites can be shown to have two different opposites: first, random choice as the opposite of specific choice (1 vs. 2), a choice guided by the identity of the referent;[1] and second, hypothetical existence as the opposite of factual existence, i.e. existence in the real world (ambiguity in 4).

1) *random* Tu n'es encore pour moi qu'un petit garçon semblable à cent mille petits garçons. Et je n'ai pas besoin de toi. Et tu n'as pas besoin de moi non plus. Je ne suis pour toi qu'un renard semblable à cent mille renards. Mais, si tu m'apprivoises, nous aurons besoin l'un de l'autre. Tu seras pour moi unique au monde. Je serai pour toi unique au monde.

2) *specific* Il y a une fleur... je crois qu'elle m'a apprivoisé...

4) *fact/hyp* teacher: Die Polizei sucht einen jungen Mann, der im Umkreis der Schule Mädchen belästigt!
pupil: Wo kann ich mich melden?

The second dichotomy can be explained with reference to a theory of possible worlds, in particular the one developed by Robert Martin (1983). It can be shown that factual existence can combine either with random choice or with specific choice, which means that the two oppositions do not coincide. As for hypothetical existence, it normally implies random choice (with some exceptions that can be explained through second order possible worlds).

It is the factual/hypothetical existence dichotomy that has clear correlates on the syntactic level, namely for definite pronominalization: only a factually existing referent can be re-presented through a definite pronoun or noun phrase; a hypothetically existing referent cannot, unless it is in the same (or in a depending) possible world:

4) Die Polizei sucht einen jungen Mann, der im Umkreis der Schule Mädchen belästigt.
4a) teacher's reading: ...Er hat grün gefärbtes Haar.

[1] Another interpretation of the same dichotomy would be: referent identity known versus unknown to the speaker. This means that specificity would be a kind of half-way definiteness, as definiteness can be understood as: referent identity known to both speaker and hearer.

Unfortunately, however, there are examples of indefinite specific reference in the sense of specific choice which do not fit the above definition.

3) - Qu'est-ce qu'un rite?
- C'est ce qui fait qu'un jour est différent des autres jours, une heure, des autres heures.

Instead of looking at knowledge of identity, a wider definition takes relevance of identity as criterion, knowledge of identity being only one possible aspect of it.

4b) pupil's reading: ...So einen jungen Mann kenne ich!
4c) pupil's reading: ...Er sollte möglichst tätowiert und gepierced sein.

Moreover, in Romance languages like French or Spanish, the mood of a possible relative clause correlates with the existence status of the antecedent, hypothetically existing antecedents having subjunctive relative clauses:

5a) Je veux épouser un homme qui écrit des poèmes.
5b) Je veux épouser un homme qui écrive des poèmes.

(after Galmiche 1983:68-69)

5c) Quiero casarme con un hombre que escribe poesías.
5d) Quiero casarme con un hombre que escriba poesías.

On the other hand, the specific choice / random choice dichotomy can be shown to have correlates on the lexical level, i.e. in the semantics of indefinite determiners. Therefore, the second part of the presentation deals with the indefinite specific / non-specific determiners of the French, Spanish and German languages, namely the following forms:

[SPECIFIC]			[RANDOM]		
Fr.	Sp.	Ger.	Fr.	Sp.	Ger.
(un) certain/s	cierto/s	(ein) bestimmte/r	quelque	algún	irgendein irgendwelche
		(ein) gewisse/r	n'importe quel/s	cual(es)quier/a (un...cualquiera)	
			un/de quelconque/s		
			divers	diversos	diverse

The first distinction in this field is between existence- and random-centered forms, with existence being presupposed in random-centered (6), and asserted in existence-centered forms (7).[2] This is shown through their behavior under negation:

6) Je **ne** suis **pas** prête à épouser quelque poète / un quelconque poète.
No estoy dispuesta a casarme con algún poeta / un poeta cualquiera.
Ich bin **nicht** bereit, irgendeinen Dichter zu heiraten.

7) Je **ne** suis **pas** prête à épouser n'importe quel poète.
No estoy dispuesta a casarme con cualquier poeta.

But above all, specificity and non-specificity can be shown to exist in three different variants, which, in the languages examined, exist partly as nuances of usage of more general indefinites, but to a good part also as inherent meaning features of very specialized specific/non-specific determiner forms.

The first variant manifests itself most clearly in the combination of random determiners with all kinds of mass terms: the resulting meaning feature can be paraphrased as "any quantity whatsoever of" and shall be called QUANTIT-RANDOM:

8) Tendrás que darle algún dinero.
Il faudra lui donner quelque argent.
9) ...no sin derramar alguna sangre...
...non sans verser quelque sang...
10) ...si queda algún calor,...
...s'il reste quelque chaleur,...

Its opposite will be the feature QUANTIT-SPECIFIC, paraphrasable as "a certain quantity of":

11) Il est resté un certain temps avec elle.
12) Hace falta un cierto valor para hacer eso.

Both semantic aspects can be shown to occur not only with mass terms, but also with certain types of count nouns, namely pluraliatantum and the nouns for measurables. The second variant is the "normal" form of specificity/non-specificity, i.e. its "identity" variant, which has to be considered as only one variant among others as soon as the existence of other variants is taken into consideration. This aspect, which is probably the standard one, shall be called IDENT-SPECIFIC versus IDENT-RANDOM. As for the third variant, some examples of specificity manifest the feature "a certain type of", which is the combination of specificity with the "sorts of" reading of nouns – a form of reference possible for nearly all types of nouns and semantically close – though not identical – with "(definite-singular-)type" genericity. This form of specificity shall be called QUALIT-SPECIFIC (13), and it has its opposite in the feature QUALIT-RANDOM, i.e., the nuance "whatever type of" (14):

13) Comme vous le savez peut-être, notre gouvernement a récemment décrété un embargo sur l'exportation de certaines marchandises.
Como sabrán, nuestro Gobierno prohibió recientemente la exportación de ciertos productos.
Wie Ihnen vielleicht bekannt ist, verhängte unsere Regierung vor kurzem einen Ausfuhrstopp für gewisse Waren.

14) Tu peux combiner ce plat avec n'importe quelle bière...
Este plato lo puedes combinar con cualquier cerveza...

Just as the "quantity" variant is not restricted to mass terms, the "quality" variant is not restricted to nouns in "sorts of" readings either. Designations for persons, for instance, in general lack a "sorts of" reading. Nevertheless, they can be combined with QUALIT-SPECIFIC, and also with QUALIT-RANDOM, determiners. In the latter case, the result will be the appearance of an unexpected pejorative nuance. The explanation of this pejorativity can be found in some special kind of cognitive schema, which points to the importance of specificity as a universal cognitive category of human beings and human societies.

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[2] Only existence-centered forms are real indefinites, while random-centered determiners resemble the totalizers.

Propositions and rigidity in Layered DRT

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Abstract for the workshop "Direct Reference and Specificity"

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Layered DRT is an extension of DRT designed to account for the interaction of various kinds of information that can be conveyed by a discourse, by keeping them apart and distributing the information over separate *layers* of the same LDRS. The syntax of LDRT simply pairs every condition and marker with a layer label; a.o. there are labels for implicated material (*i*), *assserted* or *Fregean* truthconditional content (*f*), contextually given or situational content (*s*), presuppositions (*p*), and layers representing formal properties of the discourse, like word order and gender features.

An example:

(1) a. Maybe Sam is right

b. $[\ x_s : \mathrm{Sam}_s(x), \Diamond_f[\ : \mathrm{right}_f(\mathrm{x})\ ], \neg_i\Box_i[\ : \mathrm{right}_i(x)\ ]\ ]$

In this example the proper name is interpreted as representing information already given in the context, the actual asserted content is represented by the first subLDRS labeled *f*, the second subLDRS represents the implicature that Sam is not necessarily right.

The semantics of LDRT relativizes the notion of truth to *truth with respect to a set of layers*, e.g. $M \models_{s,f,i}$(1b) iff there is someone called "Sam" who is possibly but not necessarily right. In a modal semantics we can now also define *L*-contents, i.e. the set of worlds in which we can truthfully embed the LDRS with respect to a set of layers *L*, e.g. $\|(1b)\|_{s,f}$. Unfortunately, more often than not a set of layers doesn't combine to make a well-formed LDRS but rather expresses an *open proposition*, as, for example, does the *f* layer of (1b). We will give a two dimensional Kaplanian semantics in order to account for propositions like $\|(1b)\|_f$. The idea is to select a second set of layers to represent material that is backgrounded or contextual (in this case just the *s* layer of the current LDRS, but e.g. The layer for accommodated presuppositions or even a whole earlier LDRS, representing the interpretation background, will be useful in other examples). Evaluating these background layers at a the Kaplanian context parameter will allow us to construct an *external anchor*[1] against which we

1 The idea of using anchors to emulate Kaplan in DRT is considered (and rejected) by Zeevat (1999).

can then evaluate the desired "open" layers of our LDRS.

In this way we will also do justice to the rigidity of proper names and indexicals by evaluating their descriptive content (represented at the *s* layer) with respect to the context in determining $\|(1b)\|_f^s$, the Fregean content, i.e. the proposition that *x* is right, given a contextually identified individual *x* called "Sam".[2]

Our incorporation of Kaplanian semantics also allows us to counter the Kripkean/Kaplanian argument that has been raised against other treatments of directly referential expressions in DRT, by Zeevat (1999) and by Abbott (2002) arguing against Geurts' (1997,2002) presuppositional/DRT analysis of proper names. The point is that we can assign different truth conditions (in the sense of *f* contents) to (2a) and (2c), as is shown by their respective LDRS representations (2b) and (2d).

(2) a. You are an addressee

b. $[\ x_s : \text{addressee}_s(x), \text{addressee}_f(x)\ ]$

c. The addressee is an addressee

d. $[\ x_f : \text{addressee}_f(x), \text{addressee}_f(x)\ ]$

So, although $\|(2b)\|_{s,f}=\|(2d)\|_{s,f}$, we will see that, at least for the *non-referential* reading of the description in (2c), at every utterance context *c*; $\|(2b)\|_f^c \neq \|(2d)\|_f^c$ because only (2d) expresses a trivially true proposition.

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2 In Kaplan's (1989) terms this *f* proposition expressed by (1a) is the proposition that *dthat(the person called `Sam')* is right.

The capacity to keep track of specificity: the genuine vs. the linguistic

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'Specificity' is an ambiguous term. Roughly, for linguists, it refers to uniqueness in a domain of interpretation; for some other people in cognitive science – like we are –, it refers to uniqueness in the world. At first glance, it is by no means clear how the two uses relate to each other: whether they clash or differ, and if they differ, whether they can be made compatible. We are inclined to embrace the second option, emphasizing the incompatibility of the two uses – and in what follows we try to give a proper argument in favor of it.

1. Genuine specificity

Some one and a half year ago we started a research into the status of mental representations (as traditionally conceived, á la Fodor 1987) and the role they play in social cognition, namely whether mental representations are sufficient for an organism like man to cope with social situations. We ended up with four distinct criteria that constitute a disjunctively exhaustive set for introducing representations into one's theoretical talk (see Tarnay and Pólya, forthcoming). However, as our work progressed, we came across a host of cases of processing information from animal cognition to human social communication that did not sit well with how we originally conceptualized the conditions for representations. For while representations are commonly thought of as a processing aid ñ mental, conceptual, linguistic, or what not ñ to *generalize* over previous, or to *project* onto new, instances of stimulus information ñ i.e., they are of particular *types* ñ, the newly found data comprised cases when certain species like rodents, birds, whales, primates and, last but not least, humans, distinguish among family or group members. That is, they make *within-category discriminations* by detecting special physico-chemical substances (e.g. tastes, secretions, odors, sounds) or morphological parts (e.g. head-and-neck, faces, gait) released by or appertaining to particular conspecific members. Since such substances or '*proper parts*' as we call them are causally linked to a given organism and its physical existence, they are indicative of its singular and unique character, i.e., they are *indexes* of individuals. We claim that such individual specificity is inherent in the variability of the environment, or in what we call *environment specificity***.** We then define specificity recognition as a case when an organism is endowed with a sufficiently fine-grained sensorial and processing system ñ i.e. *organ specificity* ñ to pick up idiosyncratic information. The latter is the lower ñ sensorial ñ bound of recognition of physical uniqueness. Thus, if an organism is sensitive to such single substances, it has the capacity to individuate, or to *keep track* of, the specific members the said substances belong to. A capacity like this is, we submit, sharply different from a capacity, say, to tell an edible fruit from a non edible one, a territorial intruder from a group member, a predator from a prey, etc. The latter are all cases of categorical perception or discrimination: they imply distinctions *among categories* like edible/non edible, intruder/home mate, predator/prey, etc. Thus we are going to call the former capacity, the one to individuate individual members (of a given category) as *recognition of specificity* and contrast it with *categorical discrimination*.

It seems that the former cannot be reduced to any of the possible modes of the latter. To be clear, we do not want to deny that in many cases (possibly unique) category membership is sufficient to identify an individual, provided that certain epistemic and pragmatic conditions obtain. But identifying is not recognizing individuality. For instance, having long, brownish curly hair may be identifying in a context, but it is not sufficient to constitute an individual *across contexts*, or *a-contextually*, simply because there could well be other individuals exemplifying the very same property. That it constitutes a unit set (in some or more contexts) is purely contingent fact. And it remains so irrespective of how complex a property we would wish to choose.

2. Language and specificity

Approaching language with the assumption that it is tailored to convey genuine specificity is at least controversial. But if we accept that categorical thinking predates language, and as a consequence, language can only contribute to further refining existing categories or creating new, more precise ones, the case for a specificity-specific language or linguistic ability could seem to be made.

Traditionally speaking, in theory the specificity/non-specificity contrast can be treated at either a syntactic, or a semantic, or a pragmatic level. Note that with the rise of psycholinguistics a separate cognitive level has been added. Historically, the problem appears as the referential capacity of language: reference (denotation, designation, etc.) is distinguished from meaning (sense, intension, conceptual content, etc). It seems to be most proper to keep the two corresponding problems distinct. For the first demands an inquiry into the structure of specificity itself; it implies an

ontological bias. Whereas the second implies a theoretical investigation of the level at which specificity could be most adequately treated; it asks about the expressive power of language.

Clearly, we cannot offer an exhaustive analysis of even the most important philosophical and linguistic theories covering these phenomena here. Rather, we would like to concentrate on the impact dynamic semantics in general, and Hans Kamp's Discourse Representation Theory in particular have made on theoretical thinking about specificity and co-referential relations, the suitable account of which seems to lie at the heart of our dilemma. But first we have to explain what is meant by the kind of specificity ubiquitously applied in linguistic theories, domain specificity.

2.1 Domain specificity

As a representative example, consider Groenendijk and Stokhof's (1981) suggestions about linguistic individuation. They claim that specificity is a proper domain of pragmatics, that is, language use, so that a term is used specifically only if it refers to an individual the speaker's utterance (in a given situation and according to him/her) is about. In other words, specificity depends on what the speaker knows about the proper denotations of the terms used. Groenendijk and Stokhof take pains to stress that specificity in their sense is objective and thus differs from the subjective condition of having a particular individual in mind. The latter is independent from using terms to denote particular individuals. If one knows one's language, the denotations of its terms, he can use it intersubjectively, even when the different speakers of the language have different beliefs about the world (while they share the knowledge about the use of their language).

Now, is it true that this pragmatic analysis of specificity captures the idea of genuine specificity? If we give a closer look to the technical apparatus of the authors, it appears that the idea of knowing the denotation of a term falls back on a prior knowledge concerning how the world (the relevant situation) is. How else can we understand their requirement that one cannot use the sentence

(l) A friend called me up tonight.

specifically if there were two friends who phoned me that night? Specificity in this sense boils down to domain specificity, or to knowledge of the proper extensions of the terms of the language one uses. This may point to another important aspect of linguistic specificity, namely *uniqueness with respect to a given universe* (or domain) *of discourse*. In linguistic theories it is often assumed that once a variable (such as the one corresponding to 'a friend' in (1) is bound, that is, assigned a value, no misunderstanding or mistaken reference with regard to it can take place. That means the reference of the variable can with no extra effort be re-identified by the hearer. But the problem crops up, of course, at the onset of interpretation and value assignment when there is more than one value in the domain of discourse to be found that the variable may assume. It is exactly in such cases that (1) cannot be used specifically (e.g. when at least two friends called the speaker the given night). Thus (1) cannot be specific on its own.

The uniqueness claim which figures almost in every semantically or epistemically biased linguistic theory is undoubtedly an important corollary of specificity. But it may not be enough in many cases. For consider for a moment, as an analogy, visual indexical individuation. Imagine a series of snapshots of a movie depicting a story about a princess who comes to be enchanted by some evil power. Keeping track of an individual through and across domains (i.e. different snapshots) is independent of how many members a given domain has (viz. domain specificity). If I want to represent the tale about the princess who enjoys her life in one shot and who has become a frog in another, it requires that I can keep track of her through the shots, but it does not require that she should be the only available princess in the first shot (domain) or the only potential frog in the other.

2.2 File change semantics and Discourse Representation Theory

That the problem of cross-identification cannot be resolved by relying on domain specificity can be illustrated with file change semantics. (Cf. Heim 1982) Some of the theory's proponents (e.g. Corazza 1995) make a distinction between *external* vs. *internal* identity relations between files. They ground their distinction on the idea that indexicals cannot establish internal coreference between files which are separate clusters of information (about discourse referents) the speaker heaps up gradually as he/she proceeds in understanding linguistic discourse. In our terminology, this means that files cannot serve for keeping track of the same object; they only do so through perception (until the object is in sight); this is why Perry introduces a separate category called 'buffers' as distinct from files which store information. Thus, it follows that by conceptualizing the perceptual content one does not necessarily keep track of the object indexically referred to; one may well lose sight of it and establish two different files (or buffers) even while subsuming them (the different appearances of the object) under the same category.[1] Since files are packages of information, they need not coincide with categorical or conceptual knowledge. This allows for obtaining different relations among files. The strongest one is called coreference or internal identity when the content of a given file or buffer is incorporated into another one. But there are weaker relations, like transference, when someone imagines to be someone else without thereby identifying himself/herself with him/her. Another famous example is the identity between Tully and Cicero, which may or may not obtain internally, viz. between files, while it does obtain in the external world.

The latter example clearly shows that files change semantics is not so much concerned with how internally obtained identity relations or coreferences correlated with external identities, but rather with descriptive or attributive cases à la Donnellan (1966). It can thus explain how it is possible that one identifies *X* as a spy even though he/she does

[1] There is no guarantee, however, that pace Corazza proper names are essentially different (being labels of files).

not know who *X* is (viz. Ortcutt). What seems to be more problematic is the mirror-image of "splitting" concepts or categories. For when it comes to the question how one can track down the same individual in different files and buffers, the only thing the theory can say is that they get incorporated into each other. It simply presupposes a capacity to create coreferential links between stored information, and thereby it begs the question of how genuine specificity is possible. Since such links cannot be inherited from indexical (external) relations, there is an almost infinite source for creating internal links. This may explain imaginary cases, but it might also become overly prolific.

Yet, the problem is not so much with the number of possible identity relations between files, but rather with how the mechanism that co-indexes certain files work. When, for instance, we imagine that a princess is turned into a frog, do we incorporate all information within the princess-file into the frog-file? If not, can we go on saying that one file is incorporated into another, provided that files are packages of information indexed by proper names (or maybe by some other means)? It seems that if specificity is tantamount to clustering clusters of information (and so on *ad infinitum* perhaps), what we lose sight of is precisely the specificity of the individual (singular) object.

The proper grasp of genuine specificity seems to be beyond the capabilities of another, perhaps the most prominent, theory in the dynamic branch of semantics, the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), devised by Hans Kamp. (Kamp & Reyle 1993) The problem itself is faced, as common in linguistic theories, when the analysis of de re sentences is attempted. However, DRT assumes that sentences can not only be regarded as abstract entities of language but rather as instruments of communication being actually used and interpreted by language users. Consequently, it maintains that a semantic analysis of sentences is greatly supported by importing theoretical constructs of a quasi-psychological nature, i.e. ones that model the knowledge state of the speaker and/or the hearer relevant to the interpretation of sentences. Thus, consider that, for example, a de re belief is a ternary relation between the believer, the property believed by the believer and the thing to which the believer attributes this property. Say, Oscar has a de re belief about one of his friends when he believes that Mary kissed his friend, and has a particular friend in mind. There, Oscar attributes the property of 'having been kissed by Mary' to the friend involved. (Clearly, a sentence describing Oscar's belief state of the same content may easily be put in words, too.) So Bende-Farkas & Kamp (2001) note:

> [It is important] that many of our thoughts are *about* other people or things – thoughts, in other words, through which we are related to *them*. And that, moreover, there are linguistic forms which seem to be describing just such entity-related thoughts. […] We will assume that the kind of »relational thought« is possible only when the subject has an individual-representation for any individual with respect to which his thought is *de re* (or, in other words, the individual to which his thought relates him). And we will […] take such individual representations to have the form of so-called anchors. (19)

Anchors (the notion is to be clarified in a moment) are argued to be especially useful when a person does not possess a single but rather a set of attitudes towards the very same entity.. Say, Oscar may doubt that George has kissed Mary but also hope that he will and that Mary hopes so, too – here one plus two anchors are needed to represent Mary in Oscar's second and third attitude, respectively. In cases like this, Bende-Farkas and Kamp say that diverse attitudinal states share a discourse referent.

For Bende-Farkas and Kamp (see 2001: 17ff), anchoring is also an attitude of the cognizer, but not a propositional one. It is represented in their Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs) as a composite of a mode indicator – whose only job is to introduce the anchoring relation into the representational complex – and the specification of the information content through which the relevant entity is represented by the subject. Subsequent anchors will borrow their information content from that first specification, sort of referring back the cognizer to the content given at the onset. Such variables internal to the DRS are called *internal anchors*. Obviously they are construed as co-indexing elements, securing a referential content to be available in the context of the relevant attitudes only with respect to an original specification of content. I.e., they cannot reach outside the domain defined by the given Discourse Representation Structure, and hook onto someone or something in the external world. For that is what *external anchors* are for. Whenever a subject has an object in thought which a real-world entity does correspond to, an external, binary, statement will be added to the DRS at hand, so that the (set of) internal anchor(s) variable be bound to that entity. That is, according to Bende-Farkas & Kamp (2001: 20ff)

> [t]he external anchor <*x*, x> confirms that the subject's internal representation *x* is anchored to (and thus represents) the object x. (We also call x the *external anchor* for *x* in this case.) Note that the external anchor is not part of the representation of the mental state, but an external judgement, of which the subject himself is not capable. Internal anchors presuppose an external anchor: When there is an external anchor for an internally anchored discourse referent, then it is the thing for which the discourse referent stands. If there is no external for the internally anchored *x*, then the internal anchor is deficient, *x* suffers from a reference failure and all the representations in which *x* occurs fail to determine well-defined propositional content. (21)

Note that external anchors are no good for the subject in determining whether there is an external object he thinks is referring to, let alone in determining the specific referent of a mental or linguistic expression – they only establish, *unbeknownst to the subject*, a sort of ontological warranty for there occurring no vacuous references in the subject's thoughts concerned (and utterances based on those thoughts). But *genuine specificity of an entity*, we maintain, *must be in some form available to the mind of the cognizer* dealing with it. That is decidedly not the case here.

To put it sharply, what the theory accomplishes is to secure domain specificity, by virtue of internal anchors (no matter how complex domains the theory can cope with!), and to introduce some placeholder notion, viz. that of external anchors, as the one that should carry the burden of grasping what we call genuine specificity. However, it is unclear how *genuine specificity* could be preserved *mentally* once the cognizer starts considering *internal* anchors during linguistic understanding, *unless* by his/her reliance on the very same mechanisms that secured the grasp of genuine specificity at the level of *external* anchors in the first place. But to explain how those mechanisms work, we submit, demands a much more detailed scrutiny of how lower and higher order cognition can cope with the task – and that is where the notion of *proper part* and related notions, as explained in Section 1, may come in very useful (see also Tarnay and Pólya, forthcoming, for a book-long discussion). One may consider, as DRT theorists seem to do, the cognitive processes at work as responsible for, say, 'external anchoring', and label them accordingly, but that does not make those processes any more linguistic. On the contrary, proper parts are grasped via low-level cognition such as olfaction, facial and gait perception and so on, rather than by means of (sets of) linguistic predicates.

3. Conclusions

Although some may wish that our linguistic mechanisms be able to grasp genuine specificity, we have been arguing against such an impression. Categoriality involves domain specificity and genuine specificity simply cannot be equated with domain specificity. If you grasp something through categories (concepts or predicates), you will only end up with a vague, if not necessarily undetailed, draft or outline. What would you envisage, for example, if I tell you about my father's favorite 'black hat with a gray band'? You may picture it as an old-fashioned black hat with a gray band – and what? At best you also envisage it as wrinkled or smooth, shabby or shiny, stained or clean, and so on. Of course, you can come to know a couple of things about it. You may be able to judge if my father is wearing his favorite hat or not, find it in his closet, compare it to other hats, etc. But except for the case when, by sheer luck, you imagine the old piece of cloth exactly the way it is (a very rare case indeed), there will be a whole world of difference between the actual hat and what you will have grasped.[2] For words and concepts are aimed at capturing the world in a sufficiently abstract and concise manner so that generality – viz. commonality with other objects – is almost always preferred to hooking onto things in their specificity – viz. physical uniqueness – or, as in terms of the example above, one envisaged sample of 'black hat' would do just as well as another. But that is not how genuine, physical specificity works. For the fine-grained details of the latter are beyond, or more precisely, below, the rather rough categorial reach.

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[2] It is important to note here that our argument does not turn on some realist or correspondence theory of truth. That is, it does not matter *how far* the envisaged mental 'hat-object' resembles, or corresponds to, some actually existing hat. It is exactly the reverse: provided that there exists some distinguishable (i.e., spatiotemporally distinct) object unique in every sense, does language offer us a means to grasp it in its specificity? What we argued for here is that it does not. But we also tried to suggest that it need not have to simply because language was not designed for that, and we should not blame it for something it is not expected to achieve.

Island-escaping indefinites and scopal independence

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While it is tempting to analyze island-escaping indefinites (i.e. indefinites that scope out of syntactic islands) in referential terms, two facts suggest that this move cannot suffice. First, some indefinites may scope out of islands and yet appear within the scope of some other quantifiers; a referential analysis is untenable for such cases (Reinhart 1997). Second, some instances of disjunction display the same island-escaping behavior as indefinites, even though they cannot be said to 'refer' in anything like the usual sense. Both facts may be accounted for by analyzing indefinites and disjunctions in terms of quantification over Skolem functions, in the spirit of the theory suggested by Hintikka to account for so-called 'branching' readings of first-order quantifiers and connectives. We discuss some of the weaknesses of the resulting theory, and the prospects for a purely pragmatic alternative to it.

Specificity, Singleton Indefinites, and Intonation

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1. Schwarzschild (2001) proposes a view of specific indefinites as "singleton indefinites". He starts from the assumptions (i) that indefinites express existential quantification, and (ii) that quantifiers have implicit domain restrictions. The idea is to attribute the exceptional scope behaviour of indefinites to properties of the domain: In particular, if the domain of an existential is a singleton, then the scope of the indefinite relative to a higher quantifier is neutralized, giving the (false) impression of wide scope. Suppose, for example, that there was a party at which various movies were discussed.

(1) (a) Everyone at the party voted to watch a movie that Phil liked.
(b) A movie that Phil liked was such that everyone at the party voted to watch it.

If Phil likes exactly one movie, then the restrictor of the indefinite has a singleton extension and (1)(a) is (relative to this situation) truth conditionally equivalent to (b). Even if Phil is known to like more than one movie, the indefinite in (1)(a) can still be read as a singleton indefinite, if the quantificational domain is implicitly restricted, e.g., to those movies that were relevant in this situation. So, according to Schwarzschild, any indefinite could be a singleton indefinite. Comparing indefinites to other quantifiers Schwarzschild argues that only indefinites appear to take exceptional scope, because only they can be singletons. Since implicit domain restriction is a general feature of quantification, the singleton account of specificity appears to be more general and therefore superior to scopal approaches.

Though the idea of deriving specificity effects from singleton domains is attractive, there is a problem: The singleton domain approach does not account for the speaker-hearer asymmetry attributed to specific indefinites. Since implicit domain restrictions are commonly held to be given by the context, or common ground, both speaker and hearer should be familiar with the singleton domain restriction, which contradicts the intuition that the speaker, but not the hearer, is able to identify the referent of a specific indefinite (Schwarzschild acknowledges this problem and proposes an ad hoc privacy principle to handle it). Furthermore, it may be questioned whether the restriction to a singleton domain in the case of specific indefinites is solely due to pragmatics or may, at least in some cases, be marked by linguistic cues. In this talk, I will discuss an approach on (a subclass) of specific indefinites which also employs the idea of a singleton but makes crucial use of intonation and can explain the speaker-hearer asymmetry.

2. It is well-known that the interpretation of noun phrases is influenced by intonation. Jäger (1998), for example, investigates accents in weak quantifiers, pointing out that the position and the form of the accent separates the existential reading from the partitive reading. In Umbach (2002) the interpretation of definite noun phrases is shown to be sensitive to accenting distinguishing between a "given" and a "non-given" use (roughly corresponding to the referential/

attributive distinction). Common to these approaches is the observation that the speaker uses intonation to indicate which interpretation of the quantifier or definite she has in mind.

These results suggest that it would be profitable to investigate accenting in indefinites with regard to finding specific indefinites distinguished by a specific intonation pattern. Consider the German example in (2):

(2) (a) Paulsen, who is the local plumber, has been asked to provide internships for a group of local students:
Paulsen: */EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN, [aber zwei sind mir zuviel.]*
(I would take one student, but two are too many for me.)

(b) Grün, the owner of the drugstore, has been asked, too. At first, he is reluctant. But then he says:
Grün: */EINEN Schüler würde ich \NEHMEN [nämlich den kleinen Otto Pitzke. Weil doch der Vater mit mir im Verein ist.]*
(I would take one (of the) student(s), namely Otto Pitzke...)

The indefinite NPs in both (a) and (b) carry an accent on the indefinite article, which is in German homophonous with the numeral *one*. The indefinite NP in the (a) version is clearly non-specific, the indefinite in the (b)-version, however, is specific. This raises the question of whether there are two readings, each with a topic accent on the determiner.

3. Eckardt (2002) investigates quantifiers in topic position which carry an accent on the determiner, cf. (3) and (4). She argues that the quantifiers in (3) and (4) differ in interpretation: On the "referential reading", in (3), the NPs are partitive relating to subgroups of the previously given plural referent *seven dwarfs*. The subgroups may have the same cardinality, but they must be disjoint, i.e. no dwarf both peels potatoes and roasts sausages. Furthermore, the NP *the others* can be felicitously used in a continuing sentence (*THREE dwarfs were peeling potatoes. The OTHERS were roasting sausages*). Finally, assuming that (3)(a)-(c) are answers to the question *What did the dwarfs do?*, they must be exhaustive, i.e., each of the disjoint subgroups has to be mentioned. Thus, we learn from (a)-(c) that the overall number of dwarfs is seven.

(3) The [seven] dwarfs were busy cooking dinner.
(a) /THREE dwarfs were \PEELING POTATOES.
(b) /TWO dwarfs were \FETCHING BEER, and
(c) /TWO dwarfs were \ROASTING SAUSAGES.

On the "denotational reading", as shown in (4), the NPs denote quantifiers of different cardinality. They may, but need not, refer to subgroups of a given group of objects. So this reading need not be partitive. Although the quantifiers have to be of different cardinality, the denotations may overlap, and the NP *the others* will not be felicitous in a continuation (... *I had increasing numbers of red spots: FOUR spots appeared on MONDAY. #The others were visible on Tuesday.*) As answers to the question *How many spots were visible on what day?* (4)(a)-(c) need not be exhaustive and the cardinalities in the answers cannot be added up, i.e., from (a)-(c) we cannot infer the overall number of red spots.

(4) At different days of my measles, I had increasing numbers of red spots:
   (a) /FOUR spots appeared on \MONDAY,
   (b) /FIVE spots were visible in \TUESDAY, and
   (c) /EIGHT spots shone on my face on \WEDNESDAY.

In addition to the characteristics given in Eckardt (2002), the referential and the denotational reading of topicalized quantifiers also differ with respect the scope of negation: Referential topics induce narrow scope, cf. (5)(a), whereas denotational topics induce wide scope, cf. (5)(b).

(5) (a) The seven dwarf were playing in the garden.
   /MOST dwarfs were \NOT wearing a cap [but two of them did.] "most-not"
   (b) When I had my measles, I had large numbers of red spots.
   /MOST spots were \NOT gone by Friday [but (at least) some of them ...] "not-most"

The facts in (3)-(5) provide evidence that the referential/denotational difference is not just vagueness in the sense that there are simply different context sets used and the referential reading corresponds to one type of context set while the denotational reading corresponds to another. Instead, it seems to be an genuine ambiguity to be accounted for terms of different information structures (one option being that in the case of the denotational reading the NP is not a genuine topic but part of the comment).

4. Applying the referential/denotational distinction to our example in (2), we see that the (non-specific) indefinite in (a) is denotational, while the (specific) indefinite in (b) is referential. In (2)(a) the alternatives considered are overlapping subgroups of the students which are of different cardinality, {one student, two students, three students, ...}, while in (2)(b) there is a subgroup comprising one student, which is contrasted with a disjoint subgroup comprising the others. Here, the alternatives considered are disjoint subgroups of the students: {one student, the other students}, or {one student, another student, the rest} etc. Obviously, indefinites with an accent on the determiner[1], if they are referential topics, qualify as specifics. Let us call them "referential singleton indefinites".

Enc (1991) and Portner & Yabushita (2001) attribute to specific indefinites the properties of partitivity and topicality. (2)(b) has these properties, but since the (a)- version, although clearly non-specific, does too, these criteria cannot be sufficient. Instead, the property which distinguishes (2)(b) from (2)(a) is the disjointness condition on alternatives, i.e., the alternatives evoked by the NP are required to be disjoint subgroups of the plural-antecedent. Disjointness also provides an explanation for the speaker-hearer asymmetry that comes with specific indefinites: To carve up the group antecedent into disjoint subgroups the speaker has to have a partition in mind. That is, she has to be able to separate the singleton cell inhabited by the one she wants to talk about from to the cell comprising the others. By cutting a group into a singleton subgroup and the rest the speaker is able to pick out a referent without using a proper name or a definite description. Thus the speaker can refer to a distinct referent she has in mind, even if she is not able, or not willing, to use a definite description or a proper name. From the perspective of the hearer, however, the information conveyed by the use of a referential singleton indefinite is

[1] e.g. German *ein* or English *one, some.* However, English *a,* if accented, contrasts with *the*.

reduced to the existence of a singleton subgroup selected by the speaker, giving the (false) impression of an existential statement.

The claim that referential singleton indefinites qualify as specifics is not meant to be a claim that all specific indefinites are referential singleton indefinites. Consider the standard example in (6):

(6) (a) Paul adores Greece. This extends to his concept of an ideal wife:
A to B: *[Stell dir vor:] Paul will eine \GRIECHIN heiraten. [Also, ich finde, da geht er mit seinem Griechenland-Tick ein bischen zu weit.]*
(Imagine that: Paul wants to marry a Greek woman ...)

(b) During his holidays in Greek, Paul has fallen in love:
A to B: *[Und weisst du schon das Neueste?] Paul will eine \GRIECHIN heiraten. [Er hat sie im Urlaub kennengelernt.]*.
(Have you heard the news: Paul wants to marry a Greek woman ...)

(c) During his holidays in Greece, Paul met a Greek girl group and is full of enthusiasm.
A to B: *[Und du wirst es nicht glauben:] Paul will /EINE Griechin sogar \HEIRATEN.*
(Believe it or not: Paul even wants to marry one (of the) Greek girl(s))

The indefinite *eine Griechin* in (6)(b) is commonly held to be specific/*de re*, as compared to the non-specific/*de dicto* indefinite in (6)(a). There is no difference in intonation, both carrying an accent on the descriptive part. Obviously, the specific/*de re* indefinite in (b) cannot be captured by the notion of referential singleton indefinite. (But note, that it has been questioned whether indefinites understood *de re* can, in general, be identified with indefinites understood as being specific, cf. Ludlow & Neale 1991). Now compare (6)(b) and (c): The indefinite in (c) is a topic (indicated by the raising accent) and has to be referential because the denotational reading would require alternatives of the form one-greek-girl, two-greek-girls etc. which contradict world knowledge (monogamy). At the same time the indefinite in (c) is clearly specific, the speaker indicating that she could identify the girl Paul wants to marry (and, maybe, just forgot her name).

Let us consider another standard example demonstrating scope ambiguity:

(7) Workshop, final discussion:
(a) Jeder Teilnehmer fand /EINEN Vortrag \BESONDERS wichtig [... nämlich seinen eigenen].
(Every participant found one talk especially important, [... his own one])
(b) Jeder Teilnehmer fand /EINEN Vortrag \BESONDERS wichtig [... nämlich den von Barbara Partee].
(Every participant found one talk especially important, [... the talk by Barbara Partee])

Clearly, the scope of the indefinite in the (a)-version has to be narrow and the scope in the (b)-version has to be wide. The difference in scope need not be reflected by accent: In both cases there is a raising accent on the determiner, indicating that the indefinite is either a referential or a denotational topic. In (b) the topic is clearly referential, the speaker contrasting a specific talk with the other talks. In (a) there is also one talk which is contrasted with the other talks, although in this case the partition of the talks - one as against the others - varies with respect to the participants. Apparently, referential topic singletons may also have narrow scope with respect to higher quantifiers. This finding nicely combines with Heusinger's (2001) characterization of

specificity as the "guarantee" of reference by either the speaker or some individual introduced in the discourse. Employing the notion of referential topic singletons we can elaborate on this idea: It is not the existence of the referent that is guaranteed (note, that existence is already given by the fact that the referent is a (singleton) subgroup of a given antecedent). Instead, it is the partition of the antecedent group into a singleton cell and the rest, that is guaranteed: Either the speaker or some other individual guarantees that she is able to pick the referent out of a given group.

To conclude, referential topic singletons seem to constitute an interesting subclass of the phenomena subsumed under the notion of specificity. To explore the range of referential topic singletons within the area of specificity phenomena, data on intonation are required. For this reason we set up an experiment for German indefinites to check accenting in the case of wide/intermediate/narrow scope readings, in particular in cases where the wide scope reading does not entails the narrow scope reading (cf. Abusch 1994). Unfortunately, preliminary tests showed that subjects are reluctant to interpret such sentences and argue that the intended reading could easily be expressed by changing the word order. The experiment is still under construction.

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The Perfectivizer Particle "meg" in Hungarian as the Spell-Out of Specificity

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One central aim of syntactic investigation is to determine the set of features that are relevant and accessible for operations in syntax. These days it is a relatively well-established fact that definiteness plays a part in core syntactic processes such as case-assignment and agreement, and a wide range of phenomena have been investigated to support this idea, although there is much debate concerning the technical implementation. The same has not been as solidly established for specificity, perhaps due to the fact that languages that have articles generally differentiate these based on definiteness, and so the specificity of a DP is often taken to constitute some sort of pragmatic issue. In this paper I present data and arguments to support the claim that the Hungarian *meg*, a so-called default perfectivizer particle, is in fact the spell-out of the [+specific] feature of the Theme argument (that is, the direct object of transitives or the surface subject of unaccusatives). I show that, although this particle is apparently aspectual in nature and has been claimed to be part of the lexical entry of the perfective verb, its presence is actually controlled by the specificity of the Theme. At the same time, I would also like to position this phenomenon and its analysis in the wider realm of current research that seeks to establish syntactic connections between the feature makeup of arguments of the verb and the aspect of the sentence (see Ramchand(1997,1998), Travis(2000)).

The presentation is organized in the following manner. First, I will present data pertaining to verb modifiers (VM) in Hungarian, and briefly demonstrate how they affect the aspectual interpretation of the sentence. Then I proceed to facts showing that while some other VM's are associated with oblique arguments, when there is no oblique argument present and the VM is *meg*, this particle is clearly associated with the Theme. I illustrate the interaction of the specificity of the Theme argument and the aspect of the sentence. Then I turn my attention to the so-called Non-Specificity Effect (Szabolcsi(1986), Kiss(1995)) and argue that this effect and its neutralization by focusing or by the presence of another VM can be understood given the present analysis. Finally I discuss the conclusions and implications.

Compare the following two sentences:

(1)	a.	*Péter*	*ette*		*az*	*almá-t.*
		P	ate		the	apple-Acc
		'Peter was eating the apple.'				
	b.	*Péter*	***meg-***	*ette*	*az*	*almá-t.*
		P	MEG	ate	the	apple-Acc
		'Peter ate the apple.'				

When the preverbal position is filled by the particle *meg*, the sentence is perfective, while in its absence the sentence is imperfective. However, *meg* cannot be used to perfectivize all

predicates. Here I will concentrate on one such distinction, namely the difference between verbs with an oblique argument and simple transitives/unaccusatives:

(2) a. *Anna* ***rá-*** *írta* *a* *vers-et* *a* *táblá-ra.*
A onto-3rd sg wrote the poem-Acc the board-onto
'Anna wrote the poem onto the board.'

b. *Anna* ***meg-*** *írta* *a* *vers-et.*
A MEG- wrote the poem-Acc
'Anna wrote the poem.'

Although both sentences are perfective (and imperfective if the VM is missing), there is obviously an interpretational difference. While in (2a) there is a locative argument, and the action is completed only when the poem is on the board, in (2b) the only internal argument is the direct object, and the action lasts until the poem is written. Without going into the details of this here (for discussion see Ürögdi(2002)), it is easy to see that in some sense the VM *rá* in (2a) is associated with the locative, since it matches the locative in case, person and number. Therefore it would be desirable to claim that *meg* in (2b) is similarly associated with the direct object – this would explain why the verb with an oblique argument is not perfectivized with *meg*. At first glance this seems difficult because *meg* is not pronominal. However, one characteristic, namely the specificity of the Theme does influence the presence or absence of *meg*, suggesting a syntactic connection:

(3) a. *Zsuzsi* ***meg-*** *ette* ***az*** ***almá-t.***
Zs MEG ate-Def the apple-Acc
'Zsuzsi ate the apple.'

b. *Zsuzsi* *ette* ***az*** ***almá-t.***
Zs ate-Def the apple-Acc
'Zsuzsi was eating the apple.

c. *Zsuzsi* *evett* ***egy*** ***almá-t.***
Zs ate-Indef an apple-Acc
'Zsuzsi ate / was eating an apple.'

d. * *Zsuzsi* ***meg-*** *evett* ***egy*** ***almá-t.***
Zs perf- ate-Indef an apple-Acc
'Zsuzsi ate an apple.' (OK if the 'apple' is interpreted as specific.)

The surprising example is (3c), where the preverbal position is unfilled and the sentence is ambiguous in terms of aspect. This is related to the fact that the DO is non-specific: the VM *meg* seems to be impossible in this case. (Notice that this is clearly an issue of specificity and not of definiteness – the marking on the verb shows the definiteness of the DO, still, (3d) is grammatical with the same verb form if the DO is a specific indefinite.) Perhaps not surprisingly, the same correlation holds between the subjects of unaccusatives (which also originate as Themes) and *meg*. Meanwhile unergatives, which are assumed to have a silent cognate object that is crucially always non-specific, basically never appear with *meg*, although I will discuss the few apparent exceptions.

Based on these facts it is reasonable to claim that *meg* is in fact somehow syntactically associated with the Theme argument, in a manner similar to the oblique-doubling VM illustrated in (2a). In particular, I will argue that *meg* is nothing more than the specificity feature of the Theme argument (the DO of transitives and the surface subjects of unaccusatives) spelled out in a VP-external position, Spec of AspectP (which is more or less

standardly assumed to be the VM position in Hungarian). Thus, when the specificity feature fills the specifier of AspP, the sentence is perfective; when this VM position is empty, the sentence is imperfective; and when the Theme is an existentially interpreted indefinite, this position is filled by an existential operator (also originating from the Theme) and the sentence is unspecified for aspect. The basic structure I argue for is[1]:

(4)=(3a)



[+spec] ate Zs the apple-Acc
'Zsuzsi ate the apple.'

The structure of (3c) differs minimally in that the Spec of AspP is occupied by an existential operator, and so follows the aspectual ambiguity.

In the next part of the paper I turn to the Non-Specificity Effect discussed by the authors cited above. The relevant occurrence of this phenomenon is illustrated below:

(5) a. *Érkezett* *egy vendég* */*a vendég.*
arrived a guest / the guest
'A guest arrived. /*The guest arrived.'
b. *TEGNAP* *érkezett* *a vendég.*
yesterday arrived the guest
'The guest arrived YESTERDAY.'
c. *Fáradtan* *érkezett* *a vendég.*
tired arrived the guest
'The guest arrived tired.'

As example (5a) shows, the unaccusative predicate *érkezett* is incompatible with a specific subject. However, when another constituent is focused (5b), or when there is another VM present (5c), the Non-Specificity Effect is neutralized and the result is grammatical. It follows from the discussion above that the same problem presents itself in another form for us here. As mentioned above, unaccusatives with specific Themes are perfectivized by *meg* in the VM position, making the sentence grammatical:

(6) *Meg-* *érkezett* *a* *vendég.*
meg arrived the guest
'The guest arrived.'

[1] I use the dotted line to mean *overt feature movement* instead of traditional dislocation – for arguments in favor of the existence of such movement, see e.g. Roberts(1998), Pesetsky(2000).

Since 'to arrive' is uninterpretable as a process, (5a) with a specific subject is ungrammatical because without *meg* it has to be interpreted as imperfective. Therefore the question becomes why *meg* is not created in (5b) and (5c) (analogously with (6)), that is, why these sentences are grammatical despite the specific subject.[2] I propose that the solution to this question is slightly different for (5b) and (5c). It is a well-known fact if Hungarian (see Kiss(1995)) that focusing can neutralize aspectual differences, so that sentences with a focused constituent become ambiguous between a perfective and an imperfective reading. This is because focus is predicational, and in such cases the main predication in the sentence is located in FocP, the top-most level, and not in AspP. One possible syntactic realization of this is that the phrase moves through Spec,AspP on the way up to Focus – I investigate this option. In the case of (5c), however, the adverbial *fáradtan* originates lower in the structure that the Theme (either as a lower argument, as in Larson's work, or as the predicate of a small clause), in which case the adverb, and not the specificity feature of the Theme, moves up to fill the VM position. Since the adverb is non-aspectual, (5c) is also unspecified for aspect. Thus both (5b) and (5c) can contain a telic predicate because they have no aspectual specification.

In the final section of my paper, I discuss parallels between this analysis and Diesing's work on indefinites and other research on the topic, and also questions of why a specificity feature in Spec,AspP should have a perfectivizing effect.

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[2] As expected, the same generalizations hold for simple transitives, I will also discuss these.

On certain / specific phenomena

The "Specific/non-specific" reading of indefinites has often been treated in terms of scopes of the indefinite operator. A scope-based approach has to face at least three problems: (I) why indefinites can apparently scope wider than other quantifiers; (II) why not all indefinites have the same wide-scope possibilities, and (III) what is the role of elements such as *certain* or *specific* in triggering wide scope.

Since Fodor and Sag (1982), the literature on specificity has mostly focused on question (I); recently, two important proposals have recently emerged: a *Choice Function* account and a *Singleton Indefinite* account. The goal of this work is to examine how well each fares with respect to questions (II) and (III).

Background: Choice Functions and Singleton Indefinites

Suppose that the specific reading of (1-a) is (1-b), with the indefinite taking wide scope.

(1) a. John wants to marry a Norwegian.
b. $\exists x$[Norwegian(x) $\wedge$ want(John,marry(John,x))]

There are various technical ways to obtain this effect. One is to assume that specific indefinites are directly referential (Fodor and Sag 1982,Kratzer 1998); another is to resorts to Choice Functions (CF; Reinhart 1997, Winter 1996) bound by existential closure at different scopal positions. The specific and non-specific readings for (1-a) would be as in (2).

(2) a. $\exists f$CF(f)$\wedge$[want(John, marry(John,f(Norwegian)))] *wide-scope/specific*
b. want(John, $\exists f$CF(f)$\wedge$[marry(John, f(Norwegian)))) *narrow-scope/non-specific*

This latter view is probably the most popular at present. CFs model variable scope with means that are different from traditional quantifier raising (QR); therefore, it is conceivable that they might be insensitive to scope islands that block QR. Moreover, unlike *naive* referential approaches, they can easily obtain intermediate scopes.

In other respects, however, the linguistic status of CF is debatable. Traditional QR was modeled after the observable behavior of Wh-elements, but the CF mechanism doesn't seem to model any overt linguistic phenomenon (one example would be a language that systematically inserts scope markers in the various positions of the existential operator). A more serious problem is that the position of the existential operator turns out to be sensitive to the shape of the corresponding indefinite—in particular the absence and nature of its determiner. As well known, bare plurals never take wide scope, yet, with CF, nothing rules out the following wide scope representation.

(3) John and Jack want to marry Norwegians.
a. $\exists f$CF(f)$\wedge$[want(J&J, marry(J&J,f(Norwegians)))]
b. "there are Norwegians such that J&J want to marry them" *impossible reading*

Vice-versa, determiners like *a certain/a specific* force wide scope (4). The general question then is: how can the shape of the indefinite nominal influence the position of a (far-away) existential quantifier?

(4) John wants to marry a certain Norwegian.

a. $\exists f \mathrm{CF}(f) \wedge [\mathrm{want}(\mathrm{John}, \mathrm{marry}(\mathrm{John}, f(\mathrm{Norwegian})))]$ *only possible reading*

There is however a different way to look at indefinites, based on the observation that their specific/non-specific status partly depends on how much material is present in their restrictive portion. For instance, the objects in (5) are roughly ordered according to how likely it is for them to be interpreted specifically.

(5) Sue is looking for {a man / an old friend from school / a man she kissed yesterday at five o'clock}

Starting from this observation, Schwarzschild (2002) proposes that the apparent 'wide-scope' of indefinites is an illusion due to the fact that when an indefinite's restriction picks out a unique singular or plural individual, wide and narrow scope become equivalent. What we call "wide scope" could be more suitably termed "narrow scope which always ends up choosing the same individual".

Examples where the restrictor *must* be interpreted as a singleton property are rare; to make specificity work in the remaining cases, Schwarzschild has to make appeal to the presence of implicit material in the indefinite. In the intermediate reading, (6-a) is implicitly interpreted as (6-b).

(6) a. Most linguists have looked at every analysis which solves some problem.

b. [Most linguists]$_i$ have looked at every analysis which solves some *particular* problem *of theirs*$_i$.

Modified numeral

Schwartzschild's approach predicts that a specific interpretation will be available only for those indefinites that (possibly, with the help of implicit additional restrictions) can be made to denote a singleton property. This idea can be extended to *plural* specific indefinites, but there is faces a problem. As noted by many, indefinites introduced by simple cardinals can receive a specific reading, but those introduced by modified cardinals (*exactly 3*, *more than 5*, etc.) cannot.

(7) a. If 3 colleagues of mine get fired, the firm would profit. *specific/'wide-scope' OK*

b. If exactly 3 colleagues of mine get fired, the firm would profit. *no 'wide-scope'/specific' reading*

Suppose that *colleagues* denotes the power set of the set of all my colleagues, and that *exactly 3* behaves as a quantifier in a high position inside DP (whence the impossibility of **the exactly 3 people*, where *exactly 3* would have to appear in a position below *the*). By hypothesis, to obtain sleeplessness we need the restriction *colleagues of mine* to yield a singular property (say, a set containing a single plural individual of cardinality 3); but we know from (8) that full-fledged quantifiers do not tolerate singular properties as restrictors (see Partee 1987, Winter 1998 and Schwarzschild 2002 for discussion).

(8) ??Every current Pope is Polish. *It should mean: JP2 is Polish*

Thus, the singleton property approach looks like a promising step toward the solution of this riddle.

"Certain"

In other cases, the problem of the singleton property approach is the opposite: how do we go from a

property with an apparently large extension to one which denotes a single object. The word *certain, specific, particular* etc. must play a crucial role in this process.

(9) John is looking for a {certain / specific / particular} piece of paper.

The intuition I want to pursue is that *certain* is a metalinguistic element which pledges *additional relevant properties*: by saying *a certain P* the speaker S (or the person S′ whose viewpoint is reported) informs the hearer that P doesn't exhaust the set of true properties which he/she could add to the description of the object under discussion. By adding more properties, S could thus bring the description to characterize a single (singular or plural) element.

Interestingly, a word with the exactly opposite function can be observed in Italian:

(10) Gianni stà cercando un qualsiasi pezzo di carta.
Gianni is looking for an any piece of paper.
"John is looking for a single piece of paper, it doesn't matter which one".

In this analysis, *qualsiasi* in a signal that there are no other properties relevant for the identifiability of the piece of paper at issue. Time permitting, I will discuss the differences between *certain* and *particular/specific*, which underlies the contrast in (11) (from Zamparelli 1995):

(11) a. A {certain / ??specific} James Bond came to see you.
b. There was {certain / ??specific} sadness in her voice.

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Bare Plurals and Specificity

Ede Zimmermann

In his dissertation, Greg Carlson (1977: 9) pointed out a surprising asymmetry between singular indefinites and bare plurals: unlike the former, the latter appear to lack specific readings when used as objects to opaque verbs:

(1a) Max is looking for a book on Danish cooking.
(b) Max is looking for books on Danish cooking.

The observation has been taken to indicate that bare plurals denote, rather than quantify over, pluralities. In my talk I will try to reconcile Carlson s observation with the more traditional view that bare plurals are the plural analogues of singular indefinites and both are existential quantifiers. The key to the analysis will lie in a hybrid approach to opacity (to be defended elsewhere), according to which the argument structure of an opaque verb forces the indefinite object to be re-interpreted as a quantifier over unspecific objects.

I will also address apparent counter-examples to Carlson s generalization, such as Angelika Kratzer s (1980: 48) [German equivalent of] (2), where the plural indefinite appears to refer to a specific plurality:

(2) Hans wanted to put belladonnas into the fruit salad, because he mistook them for [real] cherries.

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