

Specificity and referentiality

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- (1) I talked with a logician. [= Karttunen 1969, ex. 20a]
- (2) x [Logician (x) & Talked-with (I, x)]
- (3) Who is the man drinking a martini? [from Donnellan 1966]
- (LN) On Russell's account, a referring expression 'b' may be combined with a (monadic) predicate expression to express a proposition which simply could not be entertained or expressed if the entity referred to by 'b' did not exist. Russell often puts this by saying that the referent of 'b' is a constituent of such a proposition; it will be convenient to follow him in this, but nothing in the present paper turns on this conception of a so-called singular proposition. (Ludlow & Neale 1991, 172; italics in original.)
- (4) I met a man. [from Russell 1919]
- (5) I met a man but I did not meet Jones.
- (6) I saw a perpetual motion machine.
- (7) Pegasus does not exist.
- (8) A. "Her husband is kind to her."
B. "No, he isn't. The man you're referring to isn't her husband." [Kripke 1977]
- (9) a. Serena Williams fought hard but the defending French open champion could not extinguish Henin-Hardenne.
b. Every Bulgarian astronomer was greeted by someone who knew the scientist as a youth.
- (10) a. I had lunch with a logician.
b. Have lunch with a logician!
- (11) A book is on the table.
- (K1) 'If a description is embedded in a (*de dicto*) intensional context, we cannot be said to be talking *about* the thing described, either *qua* its satisfaction of the description or *qua* anything else' (Kripke 1977, 158, italics in original).
- (K2) 'In "Smith's murderer, whoever he may be, is known to the police, but they're not saying,"... "Smith's murderer" is used attributively, but is *de re*' (Kripke 1977, 258f).

- (12) The oracle predicted that Oedipus would want to marry his mother.
- (12) a. the oracle predicted [Oedipus would want [[Oed.'s mother]_x Oed. marry x]]
 b. [Oed.'s mother]_x the oracle predicted [Oedipus would want [Oed. marry x]]
 c. the oracle predicted [[Oed.'s mother]_x Oedipus would want [Oed. marry x]]
- (K3) 'No *twofold* distinction can replace Russell's notion of scope. In particular, **neither the *de dicto-de re* distinction nor the referential-attributive distinction** can do so' (1977, 259; italics in original, bolding added, irrelevant footnote omitted).
- (13) X believes/hopes/desires that ...NP...
- (14) Oedipus will want to marry his mother.

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